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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of mandatory arbitration over the last two decades has
dramatically changed our legal system. With the approval and even
encouragement of the Supreme Court, U.S. companies are increasingly using
form contracts, envelope stuffers, and Web sites to require their consumers,
patients, students, and employees to resolve future disputes through binding
arbitration, rather than in court. While arbitration has been used as a dispute
resolution technique for thousands of years, in the past it has been agreed to
knowingly and voluntarily, typically by two or more businesses. The
Saltman Professor of Law, Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution,
University of Nevada Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law. I am particularly grateful
to Deborah Hensler, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Laura Nader, Judith Resnik, and Nancy Welsh
for the inspiration and insights they have provided to me over the years as I struggle to
understand how and when our systems of dispute resolution serve the interests of justice.
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involuntary imposition of arbitration in lieu of open court procedures is a new
and most controversial phenomenon.1
Critics' attacks on mandatory consumer arbitration have been impassioned.
For example, one of the most colorful court opinions states, "The reality that
the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of
access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance
policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is
overwhelming to the body politic."2
Academic and journalistic critics have been harsh as well. One well-known
article states:
As architecture, the arbitration law made by the Court is a shantytown. It fails
to shelter those who most need shelter. And those it is intended to shelter are
ill-housed. Under the law written by the Court, birds of prey will sup on
workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees; the protective
1. The controversy surrounding mandatory arbitration begins with its name. Critics of
the process feel comfortable labeling it "mandatory," "compelled," or even "cram down"
arbitration. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in
Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 39
(1999) (using the term "cram-down arbitration"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33 (using the term "compelled arbitration"); Jean R.
Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996) (using the term "mandatory
arbitration"). In contrast, defenders suggest this nomenclature is inappropriate and unfair.
Such defenders urge that as consumers always have the option to refuse the services or
products connected to binding arbitration, such arbitration is not mandatory at all. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
777, 780 (2003) (using the term "promulgated arbitration"); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer
Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington &
Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 195, 201 (1998) [hereinafter Ware, Consumer Arbitration
as Exceptional Consumer Law] ("The consumer is free to put the pen down without signing
the form. There is no duress in the typical 'adhesion' contract. A consumer who contracts in
such circumstances does so voluntarily."); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration,
Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 39, 43
(2003) ("I ask Professor Sternlight ... to stop calling contractual arbitration-mandatory
arbitration.").
In this author's view it makes no sense to dwell a great deal on the nomenclature, given
the practical reality that consumers have little if any choice but to accept the arbitration
provision mandated by the company. Even in those rare instances when a consumer has read
and understood the arbitration clause being required by the company, she likely has little
choice but to accept the clause. In many instances competitor companies will require the
same or a similar clause. Even if a competitor existed that did not mandate arbitration, it
likely would not be worth the consumer's time to conduct the extensive research necessary
to identify the competitor. Thus, this Article will continue to call the process "mandatory"
arbitration.
2. Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999).
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police power of the federal government and especially of the state
governments is weakened .... 3
Another academic critic urges that
The Supreme Court has created a monster. With the Court's enthusiastic
approval, pre-dispute arbitration clauses-agreements to submit future
disputes to binding arbitration-have increasingly found their way into
standard form contracts of adhesion.... Given the Supreme Court's blessing
in the name of a "national policy favoring arbitration," adhesive pre-dispute
arbitration clauses should expand beyond their current strongholds in
consumer contracts in health insurance, banking and securities investing to
other areas of the economy and society. . . The doctrine of rigorous
enforcement of adhesive pre-dispute arbitration clauses-what I call
"compelled arbitration"--has given large firms the power to displace the
judiciary from its role in enforcing common law claims and statutory rights.4
Journalists from many of the most prestigious U.S. newspapers have
described the practice harshly as well, as one can see from articles in the New
York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and San Francisco
Chronicle.5 At least one British journalist has also focused on the U.S.
phenomenon of mandatory arbitration, criticizing Americans for failing to
focus on the huge importance of the phenomenon. A Financial Times article
characterizes the growth of arbitration as "a silent revolution" through which
"[liarge areas of American life and commerce have silently been insulated from
the lawsuit culture. ' 6
At the same time, mandatory arbitration has its advocates. While few, if
any, would defend the most unfair arbitration clauses in which companies
impose nonneutral arbitrators or greatly limit possible recoveries, some contend
that fair binding arbitration is better for claimants than the alternative of
litigation. They urge that when companies include arbitration in form contracts,
they help consumers and employees by providing them with a forum that is
cheaper, quicker, and more accessible than litigation.7 Such defenders also urge
3. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT.
REV. 331, 401.
4. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 36-37.
5. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Private Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at Al;
Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: "You Can't Sue Us, " WASH. POST, May 22, 1999,
at Al; Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1997, at Al; Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003, at
D1.
6. Patti Waldmeir, How America Is Privatising Justice by the Back Door, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 30, 2003, at 12. While Waldmeir offers praise as well as criticism for the
phenomenon, she urges Americans to focus on how arbitration "threatens to transform their
experience as consumers and employees." Id.
7. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve
Employment Discrimination Claims, II KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 158 (2001) ("Fair
arbitral procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may
benefit workers more than judicial proceedings."); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for
April 20051 1633
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that to the extent companies reduce their own dispute resolution costs, market
forces will ensure that they pass on such savings to their workers in the form of
higher wages, and to their customers in the form of lower prices.8 Some of
these defenders also assert that voiding the contract would deny
consumers/employees their freedom of contract.9
To fully understand the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration one must
move beyond the level of rhetoric. One must also step beyond an insistence that
the way our legal system is or has been is ideal or inevitable.
Part I of this Article will examine the phenomenon of mandatory binding
arbitration in the United States. It will provide a brief history of the emergence
of this process, consider how common it is in this country, look at how courts
have responded to the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration, and note that
mandatory arbitration has not yet emerged in other countries.
Next, Part II will analyze mandatory binding arbitration's actual impact on
individuals. Although the question of whether mandatory arbitration positively
or negatively impacts most individuals has been widely debated among
academics and practitioners, empirical data is scant and not likely to resolve
this question in the near future. We have little choice but to rely on anecdotal
information and common sense to determine how mandatory arbitration affects
individuals.
Finally, Part III will focus on the broader societal impact of mandatory
arbitration. Clearly the use of mandatory arbitration is curtailing the use of jury
trials and class actions, is leading to fewer precedential decisions, and is
limiting public access to our justice system. While many would say that these
impacts, alone, show that mandatory arbitration is unjust, this Article will take
a broader perspective and consider whether the undermining of our current civil
system of justice is really a bad thing. After all, jury trials and class actions
have not always existed, nor have other aspects of our current system. To
consider whether the use of mandatory arbitration is just, this Article will go
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001) ("In a world without employment arbitration
as an available option, we would essentially have a 'cadillac' system for the few and a
'rickshaw' system for the many."); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999).
8. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89 (arguing that mandatory arbitration lowers
consumer prices because competition forces businesses to pass their cost savings on to
consumers). For a critique of the Ware argument, see Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J.
Jensen, Mandatory Arbitration: Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:
Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2004, at 75, 93 (suggesting that Ware's Panglossian argument that companies
pass on all savings to their customers is based on oversimplified economic assumptions).
9. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault; Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge,
POL'Y ANALYSIs, Apr. 18, 2002, at 8, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf
("What opponents of so-called mandatory arbitration really oppose is freedom of contract.").
[Vol. 57:16311634
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back to first principles and examine the proper goals of a system of justice. It
concludes that while informal private processes such as arbitration are not
inherently unjust, mandatory arbitration is problematic for two fundamental
reasons: lack of consent and lack of public scrutiny. First, it is highly
problematic to permit the most powerful actors in a society to craft a dispute
resolution system that is best for them but not necessarily their opponents or the
public at large. Second, principles of justice require that disputants have access
to a dispute resolution process that is transparent and open to public scrutiny.
While disputants may, in particular situations, choose private processes, it
would be improper for a society to establish entirely private dispute resolution
processes.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. The Pedigree of Binding Arbitration
Voluntary binding arbitration has a long and honorable history in the
United States,10 and also predates the formation of this country." Traditionally,
businesses have voluntarily agreed to resolve disputes through binding
arbitration, rather than through other means, because they sought expertise,
speed, efficiency, privacy, and neutral decisionmakers. Arbitration has been
particularly popular within certain industries or societies possessing their own
unique approach to dispute resolution. 12 Internationally, arbitration has been
used because it allows businesses to avoid feared biases from each others'
courts, and to obtain a result that is more enforceable in another country than a
court decree would often be. 1 3
10. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 32-33, 43-44, 101-14
(1983) (examining arbitration that existed in colonial America); William Catron Jones, Three
Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193,
194 (examining uses of arbitration in New York, beginning with the Dutch West India
Company in the 1600s, and concluding that "arbitration has been an important means of
deciding disputes since the earliest days of European settlement in New York in the
seventeenth century").
11. See, e.g., JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO
LOCARNO (1929) (discussing, inter alia, arbitration among the Gods in Greek mythology);
Daniel E. Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J.
193 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Soia Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961).
13. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7-11 (2d ed. 2001).
Arbitration agreements are typically more enforceable in foreign countries than are court
decrees because over one hundred countries have adopted the New York Convention
requiring them to enforce arbitral awards issued by other signatory countries. Id. at 8. In
contrast, fewer countries are signatory to conventions requiring them to enforce each others'
court decisions. Id.
1635April 2005]
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Courts have always supported the use of voluntary binding arbitration.
They have historically enforced both arbitral awards and postdispute
agreements to arbitrate. 14 While predispute agreements to arbitrate have a more
complex history, with some courts refusing to use their equitable powers to
hold parties to such agreements, 15 the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) 16 in 1925 has required U.S. courts to grant motions to compel
arbitration pursuant to such agreements.
Until quite recently, however, arbitration agreements were not used by U.S.
businesses to require consumers, employees, franchisees, or other weaker
parties to resolve disputes through private arbitration rather than in court.17
Instead, the use of arbitration was limited to business-to-business or
management/union contexts. Indeed, to the limited extent that the possibility of
such arbitration was considered by Congress in 1925, when it passed the FAA,
those few who spoke on the issue made clear that they did not view such a use
of arbitration as appropriate. For example, when one Senator voiced a concem
that arbitration contracts might be "offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to
captive customers or employees," the Senator was reassured by the bill's
supporters that they did not intend for the bill to cover such situations. 18
B. The Evolution of Mandatory Arbitration
The emergence of "mandatory" arbitration 19 occurred during the last
fifteen to twenty years. Its rise is linked to the Supreme Court's issuance of a
series of decisions that permitted businesses to use arbitration in situations they
had never previously thought permissible. While the securities industry had
long required its investors to sign form agreements agreeing to arbitrate rather
than litigate future disputes, 2 0 a 1953 Supreme Court decision, Wilko v. Swan,2 1
refused to apply such clauses to securities fraud claims, reasoning that the
14. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 19 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1319-23 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065)
(refusing to use equitable powers to enforce predispute agreement to arbitrate). For a good
discussion of the "ouster doctrine," see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 598-601 (1997).
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (2000).
17. As noted earlier, see supra note 1, some would quibble with my use of the word
"require" to describe companies' imposition of arbitration.
18. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9-11 (1923)); see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 75.
19. See supra note 1.
20. According to Constantine Katsoris, the New York Stock Exchange began to require
its investors to arbitrate future disputes in 1872. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Resolution of
Securities Disputes, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307, 310-11 (2001).
21. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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Securities Act of 1933 must be interpreted to prohibit such a mandatory usage
of arbitration. Emphasizing that the Act "was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor,"'22 the Court explained that arbitration
does not offer the same remedy as litigation, in that arbitrators may make
awards "without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of
their proceedings," 23 and because that arbitrator's conception of the legal
meaning of statutory requirements cannot effectively be challenged. 24
However, the Supreme Court's attitude toward commercial arbitration
changed dramatically beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. While the earliest
cases marking this shift involved arbitration between two business entities,25 by
1989 the Court had applied these precedents to reverse Wilko and require courts
to enforce arbitration clauses imposed by securities brokerage houses on their
investors. 26 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,27 the Court enunciated, for the first time, the idea that federal policy
favors arbitration of commercial disputes. 2 8 Then, in 1991, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,29 the Court held that a securities broker could
be compelled to arbitrate his federal age discrimination claim against his
employer. 30 This decision shocked many employers and employees, who had
22. Id. at 435.
23. Id. at 436.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (holding that social
policy favoring the use of arbitration in the international commercial context supported
requiring the use of arbitration in a § 10(b) securities claim between American and German
companies).
26. de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
27. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
28. Id. at 24-25 (explaining that because questions of arbitrability "must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration," "any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a
like defense to arbitrability"). Interestingly, the Court did not provide an explicit rationale
for why arbitration should be favored over litigation, and it can reasonably be inferred that
the Court was influenced by a perception, true or not, that courts were swamped with cases.
See Stemlight, supra note 1, at 660-66. While the Court had long expressed enthusiasm for
arbitration of collective bargaining concerns, its decisions had always emphasized that labor
arbitration is justified by entirely different policy concerns than justify commercial
arbitration. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960) (explaining that whereas in commercial disputes "the choice is between the
adjudication of cases or controversies in courts with established procedures or even special
statutory safeguards on the one hand and the settlement of them in the more informal
arbitration tribunal on the other," in the collective bargaining context "arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife").
29. 500U.S.20(1991).
30. Id. at 35. Gilmer argued that requiring arbitration of employment discrimination
claims would be inconsistent with public policy and undermine the role of the EEOC, but the
Court rejected both arguments. Id. at 26-29. The Court also found that Gilmer had failed to
April 2005] 1637
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previously assumed that public policy concerns would prevent courts from
compelling employees to resolve employment discrimination claims through
binding arbitration. 31
Once the Supreme Court began to issue decisions stating that commercial
arbitration was "favored" and that arbitration of employment claims could be
permitted, businesses jumped on the opportunity to compel arbitration in
contexts where they previously thought arbitration agreements would not be
enforced. In an era when they feared aspects of litigation including publicity,
jury awards, punitive damages, extensive discovery, and class actions,
companies saw arbitration as potentially protecting them from all of these
"evils." Thus, companies in a wide array of areas soon followed the lead of the
securities industry and began to use form agreements to require their customers
to agree to resolve all future disputes through arbitration rather than litigation.
By reading the decisions in reported cases, one can see that arbitration soon
began to be mandated by a broad range of industries, including financial
institutions (as to personal accounts, house and car loans, payday loans, and
credit cards), 32  service providers (termite exterminators, gymnasiums,
telephone companies, and tax preparers), 33 and sellers of goods (mobile homes,
computers, and eBay).3 4 Arbitration has even been mandated in connection
provide sufficient evidence to support his claims that the particular arbitration procedures
called for in his agreement were inadequate. Id. at 30-35.
31. Many had previously interpreted the Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), to proscribe courts from forcing employees to arbitrate
claims against their employers. In that case, the Court had held that employees whose union
contracts contained arbitration clauses could nonetheless bring discrimination claims in
court, even if they had already lost on those claims in arbitration. While Gilmer did not
reverse Alexander, see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35, it certainly created a tension with that
decision that remains to this day, leaving open the question of whether union members retain
a right to sue their employers in court on statutory claims. In Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), the Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
circuits on this issue, but ultimately punted on the question, instead ruling only that at
minimum a collective bargaining agreement could be interpreted to require an employee to
waive litigation of statutory claims only if that waiver was "clear and unmistakable." Id. at
79-80.
32. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004)
(upholding arbitration clause imposed on illiterate consumer borrower); McKenzie Check
Advance of Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 2004) (upholding arbitration clause
imposed on payday-loan borrowers).
33. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (upholding
arbitration clause imposed on consumer purchasing termite extermination services); Carbajal
v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding arbitration clause
imposed on person who obtained tax preparation services, and generally stating that
unconscionability arguments are improper where arbitration is selected "voluntarily"); Ting
v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003) (striking, as
unconscionable, arbitration clause imposed on telephone users).
34. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding
arbitration clause imposed on computer purchasers by including arbitration provision in
1638 [Vol. 57:1631
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with games sponsored by the McDonald's hamburger chain 35 and with respect
to a mail-in on a Cheerios cereal box.3 6 In this new millennium, consumer
arbitration has quickly expanded as well to health care (hospitals and health
maintenance organizations), 37 nursing homes,3 8 and educational institutions. 39
Also, some companies are now using arbitration offensively, to obtain speedy
default judgments against consumers who allegedly owe them money.40
It is difficult to assess how common mandatory arbitration clauses have
become, but they certainly seem ubiquitous. Readers can each do their own
empirical study on this question by taking note of how often they come across
mandatory arbitration clauses in their own life. I have seen arbitration
mandated by my bank, my broker, my cell phone provider, various credit cards,
and my mortgage lender. One recent study of the "average Joe" in Los Angeles
showed that approximately one-third of the consumer transactions in his life
were covered by arbitration clauses. 4 1 With respect to employment, while the
warranty brochure in computer box); Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala.
2003) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on mobile home purchasers).
35. See Popovich v. McDonald's Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. I11. 2002).
36. See Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pitfallsfor Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1994, § 1, at 37.
37. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1014-15
(Ariz. 1992) (voiding an arbitration clause imposed by an abortionist on a patient); Engalla
v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997) (holding that evidence supported
claim that arbitration was fraudulently imposed on an HMO customer); Sosa v. Paulos, 924
P.2d 357, 361-62 (Utah 1996) (refusing to void an arbitration clause imposed on a patient in
an operating room).
38. See, e.g., Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 2004 WL 1418698 (Ala. June
25, 2004) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on nursing home resident despite claims of
alleged bias and lack of opportunity to obtain nursing home placement without accepting
arbitration); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., 813 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004); Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Ford Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003). See generally Nora Lockwood Tooher, Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home
Admissions Becoming Widespread, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA (Sept. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com (subscription required).
39. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Farrell, Signer Beware: For-Profit Colleges Increasingly
Use Arbitration Agreements to Prevent Lawsuits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 18, 2003, at
A33; Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 191 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitration
clause imposed by school); Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho
2000) (holding that a child was not bound to an arbitration clause imposed by an educational
service provider because the child was merely a third-party beneficiary to the clause).
40. See Press Release, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, New Trap Door for
Consumers: Card Issuers Use Rubber-Stamp Arbitration to Rush Debts into Default
Judgments (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/model/
content/ArbitrationNAF.pdf (asserting that one arbitration provider, the National Arbitration
Forum, handles about fifty thousand arbitrations of debt collection cases each year, and that
consumers almost never prevail, even though a number of the consumers were victims of
fraudulent misuse of their credit cards).
41. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55 (focusing on industries that provided what the authors
April 2005] 1639
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percentage of employees required to arbitrate future disputes is probably lower
than one-third,4 2 it is rising.43
The new consumer and employment arbitration has a few features that
were not present even in the securities arbitration upon which it was based.
First, whereas the arbitration clauses prepared by brokerage houses were
typically included in documents required to be signed by investors, companies
soon realized that an actual signature was not required in order for an
arbitration agreement to be enforced by many U.S. courts. The FAA requires
that arbitration agreements be written, but does not mandate they be signed, in
order to be enforceable. 44 Thus, companies often impose arbitration on their
consumers by including an arbitration agreement in a document that is received
by the consumer but not necessarily read and certainly not signed. Specifically,
it is now common to include arbitration clauses in small print notices, envelope
stuffers, or warranties contained in boxes or sent to consumers in the mail.45
Some arbitration clauses are contained in Web sites, 46 and some arbitration
clauses have even been e-mailed to customers. 47
term "important purchases"-transactions that were expensive (e.g., automobile purchases),
ongoing (e.g., long distance telephone service), or that had a potentially large impact (e.g.,
purchase of health care services)).
42. One article estimated that between 8-10% of nonunionized U.S. employers require
their employees to resolve disputes through binding arbitration. Katherine V.W. Stone,
Employment Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION & WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 27, 27 (Adrienne E. Eaton &
Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to
Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute
Resolution, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2005) (citing surveys from 1998 and
2003 of establishments in the telecommunications industry indicating that between 14-16%
of such establishments had adopted mandatory arbitration).
43. According to one recent article, from 1998 to 2003 the number of employees
required to arbitrate by American Arbitration Association clauses increased from three to
seven million. Employees Signing Away Right to Sue, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 2003,
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/business/7024386.htm? 1 c.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
45. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (striking, as
unconscionable, an arbitration clause imposed on telephone users using an envelope stuffer);
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding an arbitration clause
imposed on computer purchasers by including an arbitration provision in a warranty
brochure in a computer box).
46. See, e.g., Dell Inc., Dell's Online Policies: U.S. Terms and Conditions of Sale, at
http://wwwl .us.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/policy/en/policy?c=us& 1 =en&s=gen&-
ck=lf&-section=012 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005); ebay Inc., Your User Agreement, at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html?ssPageName=f:f:US (last visited
Mar. 19, 2005); Gateway, Inc., Gateway Consumer Service Plans, at
http://content.gateway.com/www.gateway.com/about/legal/warranties/8510306ConVAS887
57B_306.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
47. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov. Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.
Mass. 2004) (holding e-mail notification insufficient to require employee to resolve future
disputes through binding arbitration).
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Second, whereas the arbitration imposed by securities brokers was
typically required at the beginning of the business relationship-that is, at the
time that the customer opened the account-companies now commonly impose
arbitration after the relationship has already commenced. Credit card
companies, for example, often send their customers small print notices stating
that all future disputes will be governed by arbitration. Sometimes companies
even attempt to use such clauses to replace ongoing litigation with arbitration.
For example, a clause issued by Banana Republic in June 2004 states that "[t]he
New Arbitration Provision applies to Claims previously asserted in lawsuits
filed before the effective date of any previous arbitration provision. '48
Third, the broad expansion of consumer arbitration has likely meant that a
less educated cadre of persons is now covered by arbitration clauses. Though
not all securities investors are well educated, it seems reasonable to assume that
such investors are better educated than the general public. In contrast, virtually
all consumers have phones and credit cards, purchase termite extermination
services, and so on. Thus, courts have had to face situations in which
consumers to whom arbitration notices were provided denied that they were
aware of the clause, understood the clause, were literate, or could see.4 9
A fourth important feature of the new consumer arbitration is that
companies are increasingly using their arbitration clause not only to require
arbitration but also to further limit consumers' procedural and even substantive
rights. For example, some companies have included clauses in their arbitration
agreements that shorten statutes of limitations, 50 limit or eliminate discovery, 5 1
require a claimant to file in a distant forum, 52 prevent consumers from joining
48. Banana Republic, Important Notice Regarding Banana Republic Credit Card
Accounts Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia 1-2 (June 2004) (on file with author).
49. See infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have
handled such clauses.
50. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding invalid an employment clause that imposed a shortened statute of limitations on
employees); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding
shortened time limit unconscionable).
51. The typical arbitration clause leaves the extent of discovery in part to the discretion
of the arbitrator, but it is well recognized that less discovery is usually available in
arbitration than in litigation. This limit on discovery will often have an adverse impact on
claimants, since information is often in the possession of the company. See Schwartz, supra
note 1, at 46-47; Stemlight, supra note 1, at 683-84. A few courts have held that they will
not enforce arbitration clauses that unduly limit access to essential documents and witnesses.
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal. 2000).
52. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-66 (Ct.
App. 1993) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause imposed by a financing organization on
California consumers that apparently required arbitration to be heard in Minneapolis,
observing that procedures that might be fair as applied to business entities are not necessarily
fair as applied to consumers); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-75
(App. Div. 1998) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement that required consumers
to arbitrate claims against a computer vendor in Chicago).
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together in a class action,53 or bar consumers from recovering particular forms
of relief (injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, or
attorney fees). 54
C. U.S. Courts' and Legislatures' Response to Mandatory Arbitration
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, lower federal and state courts
have generally enforced mandatory arbitration agreements just as they have
enforced arbitration agreements entered into voluntarily by two or more
business entities. Courts have repeatedly stated that the mere fact that an
agreement is imposed in a form agreement, or contained in fine print, is not a
legitimate reason to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause.5 5 While plaintiffs
have attempted to challenge these clauses using arguments drawn from the U.S.
Constitution, federal statutes, state constitutions, state statutes, and common
law, most of these challenges have failed, as briefly discussed below.
1. Constitutional arguments
When a party contends it has been required or mandated to resolve its
claims through binding arbitration, rather than in court, it sometimes attempts
to argue that its rights under the U.S. Constitution have been violated. While
these arguments have some intuitive appeal, and have been championed by
some scholars, they have not to date been particularly successful in court. In
order to establish a violation of the Due Process Clause, arbitration opponents
would have to first demonstrate the existence of state action, and this has
proved very difficult. When two private parties agree to arbitrate future
disputes, most courts have found no state involvement sufficient to rise to the
level of state action. 56 Moreover, even once state action is established, the
53. For a discussion of unconscionability attacks made on clauses that proscribe class
actions, see Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 8.
54. See, e.g., Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (holding an arbitration clause imposed on
employees unconscionable in part because it limited the amount of damages and front and
back pay); Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002) (holding an arbitration clause
unconscionable to the extent it foreclosed consumers' right to recover punitive damages).
55. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176-77, 182-84 (3d Cir.
1999) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause appearing in small print on the
back and near the bottom of a form contract employed as part of a secondary mortgage
contract allegedly used as part of a scheme to defraud elderly, unsophisticated low- and
middle-income home owners); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834-35
(8th Cir. 1997) (enforcing an arbitration agreement appearing on page thirty-one of an
employee handbook).
56. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-01 (9th Cir.
1998). For two arguments that state action may exist in such circumstances, see Reuben,
supra note 15, at 615-19 (arguing that the intertwining of public and private processes in
enforcement of contractual arbitration gives rise to state action), and Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration:
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challenger must demonstrate that the arbitration process is sufficiently unfair as
to violate the norms of due process.57 Given the Supreme Court's flexible view
of due process, 58 this will not be easy, and to date no court has refused to
enforce a private arbitration agreement on due process grounds.
Challengers may also attempt to argue that a binding arbitration provision
violates their rights to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. This
argument can only be made in cases in which a Seventh Amendment right
would otherwise have applied: cases brought in federal court, "at common
law," and claiming damages of at least twenty dollars. 59 The Seventh
Amendment argument seems promising for challengers in this limited number
of cases. No state action need be proven, and in the nonarbitration context
courts have upheld jury trial waivers only when the waivers are made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Many mandatory arbitration
provisions arguably would not pass this test. Nonetheless, the Seventh
Amendment argument has rarely succeeded in the arbitration context. 60
2. Federal statutory arguments
Challenges made to arbitration agreements under federal statutes have been
somewhat more successful. Even in this most pro-arbitration era, the Supreme
Court has always made clear that Congress has the power to make claims
nonarbitrable.6 1 Moreover, while it is true that, post-Wilko, the Supreme Court
has not found any federal statute that totally precludes arbitration of claims
brought under that statute, the Court has also explained that "[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."' 62 Thus, where a challenger can show that the arbitration
clause was written in such a way as to effectively prevent the challenger from
A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REv. 1, 40-47 (1997) (arguing that state action exists at least to the extent courts are
relying on a preference for arbitration over litigation to interpret the validity and scope of
arbitration agreements).
57. See generally Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1046-86
(2000); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 80-98.
58. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (stating that due process is
flexible, and emphasizing that requirements of due process depend on the context of the
dispute).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
60. For a longer discussion of the Seventh Amendment argument, see Jean R.
Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right
to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001).
61. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
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vindicating her rights under a particular federal statute, the Court has explained
that the arbitration clause should not be enforced. For example, although the
facial attack made by the plaintiffs in Gilmer failed, the Court left open the
possibility that future age discrimination plaintiffs could void a particular
arbitration clause if they could show it prevented them from adequately
vindicating their rights due to specific failings in the arbitration process (e.g.,
nonneutral arbitrators, insufficient discovery, or inadequate appeal
opportunities). 6 3 Similarly, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph,64 the plaintiffs attempted to show that they could not effectively
vindicate their rights under federal law because the costs of arbitration were too
high. Although the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim due to an inadequate
factual showing, the Court recognized that this kind of attack on an arbitration
clause can be valid.6 5
3. Contractual and common law attacks
The most successful means for challenging arbitration clauses has not been
either constitutional or federal statutory arguments, but rather contractual and
other common law attacks. As section two of the Federal Arbitration Act makes
clear, and as the Supreme Court has frequently stated, arbitration clauses, can be
invalidated on standard common law grounds. 66 For example, the challenger
may argue that the agreement was invalid due to lack of consideration,6 7 that
the clause did not cover the particular claim, 6 8 that it was invalid due to
fraud, 69 or that the clause was unconscionable. 70 Clauses most likely to be
defeated as unconscionable are those that impose excessive costs, require
claimants to travel to distant locations, limit remedies, impose a biased
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33.
64. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
65. Id. at 92. For an analysis of cases in which plaintiffs attacked arbitration clauses on
the ground that the costs of arbitration would be excessive, see Michael H. LeRoy & Peter
Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever
Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002).
66. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (stating that "[sitates may regulate contracts, including arbitration
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause
'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"' (quoting
9 U.S.C. § 2)).
67. See, e.g., Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131-32
(7th Cir. 1997).
68. See, e.g., Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 642-43 (Fla. 1999).
69. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 916-22 (Cal.
1997).
70. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aj'd in
relevant part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
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arbitrator, or eliminate the opportunity for class actions. 71 Arbitration clauses
have also been voided on such grounds as lack of mutuality,7 2 that insufficient
notice of the arbitration provision was afforded, 73 or that the party urging
arbitration waived that right by participating in litigation. 74
However, while arbitration clauses have been defeated on each of these
grounds, most mandatory arbitration clauses are upheld, even in the consumer
and employment contexts. While a few courts have refused to enforce
particular unsigned arbitration clauses for various contractual reasons, 75 in
general courts do enforce arbitration clauses contained in small print
documents, even though they were not signed by the consumer. 76 In some
cases, although the company has not been able to provide specific evidence that
the customer actually received the notice, courts have nonetheless enforced the
clause, relying on evidence regarding the system the company had in place to
send the notice to each and every customer. 77 As well, while there are some
exceptions, for the most part courts have held that even illiterate78 or blind
consumers or employees 79 can be bound by unsigned small print arbitration
71. For a discussion of the question of whether prohibiting class action remedies
renders arbitration clauses unconscionable, see Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 8.
72. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998).
73. See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that
bank customers had not consented to arbitration merely by agreeing that the bank could
unilaterally change any "term, condition, service or feature" of the account).
74. See, e.g., Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997) (finding
that manufacturer waived right to require consumer to arbitrate breach of warranty claim by
substantially invoking litigation process).
75. The predominant reason some courts have refused to enforce arbitration clauses is
unconscionability. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757 (2004).
76. However, if a contract leaves a place for a signature and remains unsigned, it
should not be unenforceable. See Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. McCarrell, 695 So. 2d 615 (Ala.
1997).
77. See, e.g., Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916-19 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(holding that consumers bear burden of proving nonreceipt of arbitration clause once
company has presented evidence that the clause was mailed); Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 820-21 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding employee bound by arbitration
clause he claimed he had not received).
78. A recent case to this effect is Washington Mutual Finance Group v. Bailey, 364
F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004), in which the court found that a group of illiterate plaintiffs were
bound by the arbitration clause they had signed in connection with obtaining loans together
with insurance they now say they did not want or need. The illiterate plaintiffs complained
that even after they told the bank they "could not read and inquired as to the nature of the
documents they were signing," the bank stated only that they were signing "insurance and
finance papers." Id. at 265. The Fifth Circuit found this complaint irrelevant, explaining that
parties to contracts have a duty to read the contract or have it read to them. Id. at 266.
79. See Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 327 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 (N.D. Miss.
2004) (holding that blindness is not a valid defense to formation of an arbitration
agreement).
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notices. In sum, courts typically void only those clauses where challengers have
presented substantial evidence of unfairness, and most arbitration clauses are
never challenged at all. Moreover, if the court finds only a single provision of
the arbitration clause to be problematic, it may well sever just that portion of
the clause, rather than void the arbitration provision in total. 80
4. State statutory and constitutional arguments
In addition to raising contractual arguments, challengers may also seek to
invalidate arbitration clauses on the ground that they are void under a state
statute or state constitution. Some plaintiffs have argued that mandatory
arbitration violates jury trial rights provided by state constitutions or statutes.8 1
To prevail on any such state law claim, the challenger would have to defeat the
argument that the relevant state statute or constitutional provision was
preempted by the FAA. Occasionally these challenges have succeeded. 82 More
frequently, however, courts find that challenges under state statutes or
constitutional provisions fail because the FAA preempts the relevant state
provision.83
D. A Uniquely U.S. Phenomenon
To date, at least, it seems that the mandatory imposition of predispute
binding arbitration on consumers and employees by companies is virtually
uniquely a U.S. phenomenon. 84 Indeed, policies issued by the European Union
80. Compare Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, 341 F.3d 256, 270-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding
that entire arbitration clause must be voided due to unfair portions), with Gannon v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a punitive damages
exclusion provision in arbitration agreements should be severed, rather than voiding the
entire arbitration clause).
81. For discussion of possible jury trial arguments, see Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and
Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17
(2003).
82. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Am. Fair Credit Ass'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Ct. App. 2002)
(invalidating arbitration provision under California Credit Services Act of 1984 because,
contrary to requirements of the Act, the arbitration provision was not signed by the credit
consumer); Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665 (N.J.
2001) (holding that employees may waive the right to judicial remedy for violation of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination in favor of binding arbitration only if the waiver is
clear and unequivocal so as to ensure the waiver was knowing and voluntary).
83. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that the
FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that arbitration clauses in franchise agreements
be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract"); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the FAA preempts an Alabama
statute proscribing use of predispute arbitration provisions).
84. For a comparison of usage of mandatory binding arbitration in the United States to
usage in the rest of the world, see Jean R. Stemlight, Is the US. Out on a Limb? Comparing
the US. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest
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preclude companies from replacing consumers' litigation option with binding
arbitration.85 However, it is important to further explain this statement to
prevent confusion.
Consumer arbitration does exist outside the United States, but it is not
imposed on a predispute, mandatory basis. For example, in Britain the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators offers a number of arbitration "schemes" to
resolve disputes in an array of industries, including travel, Internet provision,
mortgages, and home construction.8 6 After a dispute has arisen, consumers can
elect to take their disputes to arbitration, rather than litigation. In some
instances, if arbitration is elected by the consumer, the company must accept an
arbitral forum. 87
In addition, in many countries consumer disputes are resolved by a special
governmental agency. Sometimes these processes are called "arbitration"
because they are relatively informal. However, these processes are unlike what
we call "arbitration" in the United States in several respects. First, there is a
great difference between a legislature mandating arbitration and a private
company doing the same. Second, whereas U.S. arbitration permits disputants
to pick their own private arbitrator, other countries' processes provide a
government-salaried employee as the arbitrator. Third, although U.S.
arbitration is typically conducted privately, and often creates no public record
or precedent, most countries' government agencies would likely provide at
least some access to their determinations.
Thus, what is it that is unique to the United States? What is apparently
unique to the United States, at least so far, is the phenomenon of private
companies requiring their customers to agree to resolve future disputes through
private binding arbitration rather than in court. While it is very difficult to
conduct research as to the entire world, and while it is particularly difficult to
conduct research to confirm the absence of a phenomenon, to date at least this
author has not found mandatory binding arbitration in use in other countries.
Indeed, as noted above, it seems that the use of mandatory predispute
arbitration would be prohibited in the consumer context, at least in the
European Union. In 1993, the Council of the European Union issued a directive
of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831 (2002). There may be some use of mandatory
employment arbitration in Canada. See generally John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative
Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment Arbitration Agreements in the United States and
Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1007, 1008 (2002) (stating that such clauses are "still
relatively uncommon" in Canada but implying that at least some do exist).
85. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
86. Dispute Resolution Servs., Surveyors' Arbitration Scheme 2003, at
http://www.arbitrators.org/DRS/Schemes/chartered-surveyors.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2004).
87. See Stemlight, supra note 84, at 863.
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entitled "Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts."'88 An annex to the directive
listed specific practices, including mandatory binding arbitration, which "may"
be regarded to be unfair if they significantly and detrimentally impact
consumers' rights.89 While the directive, by its terms, would not seem to
unequivocally bar all mandatory consumer arbitration, subsequent interpretive
documents reveal that EU bodies have effectively prohibited the practice. For
example, a 1998 European Commission "Recommendation" states that "out-of-
court alternative[s] may not deprive consumers of their right to bring the matter
before the courts unless they expressly agree to do so, in full awareness of the
facts and only after the dispute has materialised." 90 Apparently based on these
documents, a number of EU countries have proscribed companies' imposition
of binding arbitration on consumers. 9 1
II. THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION ON INDIVIDUALS
The debate over whether mandatory binding arbitration is good or bad
takes place on two levels: the effect of mandatory binding arbitration on
individual consumers and employees and the effect of mandatory binding
arbitration on society as a whole. This Part will examine the first question.
A. Attacks on Mandatory Arbitration from the Individual Perspective
The critics' argument that mandatory consumer arbitration is detrimental
and thus unfair to individual consumers has many subparts. First, critics urge
that the nonconsensual nature of mandatory consumer arbitration is itself a
problem per se. Empirical studies have shown that only a minute percentage of
consumers read form agreements, and of these, only a smaller number
understand what they read.92 Some companies may even deliberately design
88. Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,
1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 [hereinafter Council Directive 93/13]. For further discussion of the
European approach to consumer arbitration, see Sternlight, supra note 84, at 844-48.
89. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 88, at Annex (1)(q).
90. Commission Recommendation 98/257 of 30 March 1998 on the Principles
Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes
(Text with EEA Relevance), 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31, 33. The recommendation relies on Article
6 of the European Human Rights Convention, which it characterizes as providing that
"access to the courts is a fundamental right that knows no exceptions." Id. at 32.
Commission recommendations are commonly referred to as "soft law." Although they are
not technically binding on member countries, they do have a strong practical effect.
91. See Stemlight, supra note 84, at 847.
92. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 233 (2002) (analyzing literacy research which demonstrates that a shockingly
high percentage of literate adults are incapable of extracting pertinent information from form
contracts); see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1179 (1983) (stating that empirical studies show that consumers are
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their arbitration clauses in a manner geared to decrease the likelihood that the
consumer will focus on the arbitration clause. 93 Moreover, even to the extent
that consumers might read and understand an arbitration clause imposed on a
predispute basis, psychologists have shown that predictable irrationality biases
will prevent them from properly evaluating the costs and benefits of accepting
such a clause. For example, because people tend to be overly optimistic, they
will often underpredict the need they might have to bring a claim against a
company and thus undervalue what they are losing by giving up a right to
sue. 94 Similarly, psychologists have shown that people are risk-seeking with
respect to certain prospective losses. 95 Given the motivation for profit
maximization, it seems inevitable that, absent regulation, companies will seek
to take advantage of consumers' irrational behavior by manipulating arbitration
clauses together with other aspects of consumer contracts. 96
In short, under most reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is
nonconsensual, given that consumers and employees don't typically read or
understand the clauses. Critics urge that predispute mandatory arbitration is
wrong as a matter of policy on that basis alone. By definition, arbitration
eliminates rights consumers would otherwise have had to a trial before a judge
or jury. By comparison to the rights they would have had in court, arbitration
almost certainly limits the amount of pretrial discovery available to consumers
and also limits their opportunity for appeal. Critics assert that it is
fundamentally wrong and unfair to deprive consumers and employees of their
access to court on an involuntary, unknowing basis.
Second, critics often point out that many (although admittedly not all)
consumer and employment arbitration agreements also try to slant the odds in
companies' favor from a substantive standpoint.97 There are virtually an
infinite number of ways in which a company, as the drafting party, can try to
unlikely to have read adhesion contracts before signing them, and even less likely to have
understood what they read).
93. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (showing
AT&T spent substantial resources determining how best to implement their binding
arbitration provision so that it would not be opposed by consumers), ajfd in part, 319 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
94. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 39 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
95. Cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed the
widely accepted account of decisionmaking known as "prospect theory." Under this theory,
people are often risk-seeking with respect to moderate- to high- probability losses, and risk-
averse with respect to low-probability losses. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
96. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 747 (1999) ("Manufacturers, to
survive, must behave 'as if they are attempting to manipulate consumer risk perceptions.")
(emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 110; Stemlight, supra note 1, at 652.
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use an arbitration clause to gain the upper hand, including arbitrator selection,
imposition of high costs, and limitation of remedies. While it would be wrong
to suggest that most of these excesses are included in most arbitration clauses,
some of them are quite common.
The drafter of the arbitration clause has the opportunity to select the
arbitrator or the arbitration provider. In the most egregious situations,
companies have selected arbitrators who might clearly be expected to be
biased, such as a representative of management of the company against whom a
claim might be made. Some medical clauses have required that the arbitrator be
a specialist in the same field as the doctor accused of malpractice; 98 some
suspect this will lead to few findings of malpractice. It is even possible that a
clause would name an arbitration provider that, while sounding from its name
like an independent organization, would turn out to be an alter ego of the
company or a group that only exists to service claims against that particular
organization.
Selection bias can also be somewhat more subtle. Arbitration critics
frequently discuss a phenomenon known as the "repeat provider" problem.99
Arbitration organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), are now competing to provide
arbitration services for particular companies that require their consumers to
arbitrate future disputes. Companies and providers often sign agreements to the
effect that a particular company will be named as the provider in arbitration
clauses involving certain kinds of disputes. Obviously, once an entity is named
as the provider, financial benefits accrue to that provider. Some providers take
a percentage of the fees charged by their arbitrators. In addition, even when
arbitrator fees are paid only to individual arbitrators, rather than the provider,
the provider itself eams fees for administering the disputes. Thus, charge the
critics, providers have a financial incentive to make sure that the company is
pleased with the results in arbitration. If the disputant company is displeased
with the results secured through a particular provider, it may well switch
providers. Needless to say, providers and arbitrators vehemently deny the
charge that they are biased. Providers urge that they have no direct influence
over their arbitrators. Yet, critics maintain that, consciously or unconsciously,
arbitrators may slant the result in companies' favor.
A related purported phenomenon is known as the "repeat player" bias.100
Whereas a given company will tend to arbitrate many consumer disputes, a
given consumer or employee will typically arbitrate, at most, one. Thus, the
98. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (requiring claim brought by
patient against orthopedic surgeon to be heard by board-certified orthopedic surgeon).
99. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 35-37.
100. The "repeat player" concept was first introduced by Marc Galanter, in the context
of litigation. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing multiple advantages of
"repeat players" over "one shotters" in our legal system).
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companies have far greater experience with and exposure to the arbitration
process than do the consumers or employees. There is some limited empirical
evidence that the repeat player does somewhat better in arbitration than the
nonrepeat player. 101
Companies can also use arbitration clauses to impose costs on consumers
and employees and thereby discourage them from bringing claims against the
company. Using the lingo of economics, companies can impose terms that
increase customers' or employees' transaction costs. 102 Examples of the ways
in which companies can impose high costs on consumers include selecting an
arbitrator or provider with high fees, 103 locating the arbitration in a distant
forum, 104 and limiting available discovery and thereby requiring consumers to
try to gather evidence through more expensive means. 10 5
Another method companies may use to increase consumers' or employees'
costs is to bar them from proceeding jointly with others in a class action.
Companies are increasingly using arbitration clauses to prevent class actions
from being brought against them, either in arbitration or in litigation.01 6 One
study showed that such prohibitions were contained in roughly one-third of the
consumer arbitration clauses studied in Los Angeles in 1999.107 Proscribing
class actions increases prospective plaintiffs' costs and decreases their ability to
101. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223,
239 (1998) ("The repeat player effect is a cause for concern because in dispute resolution,
sometimes the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. There is undeniably a
repeat player effect in employment arbitration. ... ); cf Hill, supra note 1, at 814
(recognizing existence of repeat player effect but denying that it is due to "repeat
arbitrators").
102. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221 (explaining
that by controlling dispute-system design, one party can impose transaction costs on the
other, thereby dramatically altering the available settlement range or making it no longer
cost-effective for the opposing party to bring a claim); see also Marc Galanter, The Quality
of Settlements, 1988 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 70-72 (pointing out that when one party imposes
high transaction costs on the other, it may encourage a settlement that would not otherwise
have been desirable).
103. An extreme was the clause formerly used by Gateway Computers. By imposing
the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, this clause required
consumers to pay thousands of dollars to resolve even a simple claim. See Jean R. Sternlight,
Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, FLA. B.J.,
Nov. 1997, at 8, 12. This clause was eventually struck down as unconscionable in Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-75 (App. Div. 1998).
104. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-67 (Ct.
App. 1993) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause, imposed by financing organization on
California consumers, that apparently required arbitration to be heard in Minneapolis).
105. See supra note 51.
106. For further discussion of the class action issue, see Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2000); Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 8.
107. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 41, at 58-65.
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prevail in a variety of ways. Many employment and consumer claims-the
latter in particular-simply are not viable, from a financial standpoint, if
brought individually.108 A single plaintiff who has been harmed to the extent of
a few dollars or even perhaps a few hundred dollars would not rationally bring
a claim in arbitration to recover those damages. The costs in terms of time,
travel, expenses;-and attorney fees simply would not be worthwhile in view of
the likely recovery. The Supreme Court and many other lower courts have
repeatedly explained this rationale for allowing class actions.10 9 In addition,
and somewhat less obviously, class actions permit claims that would not
otherwise be brought due to lack of information. Many prospective plaintiffs
may be unaware that they have been treated illegally. l 0 Nor, given the small
sum of money involved, might it even be worth their while to try to investigate
whether they are being treated illegally, even assuming they had a suspicion.
Yet, if one knowledgeable consumer figures out that a company is acting
illegally with respect to a group of consumers, she can bring a class action to
protect her less-informed fellow consumers. Similarly, whereas an individual
consumer or employee may be unaware how to bring a claim from a procedural
standpoint, class actions allow the more knowledgeable and their attorneys to
assist the less educated.111 Given these benefits of class actions, it is clear that
by eliminating the class action option, companies increase plaintiffs' costs of
pursuing a claim and thereby make it more difficult, if not impossible, for them
to bring claims against the company.
The third main argument critics make to attack mandatory consumer and
employment arbitration is that some companies use their arbitration clauses as a
means to limit plaintiffs' access to substantive relief. That is, at the same time
that they mandate arbitration, such clauses may shorten plaintiffs' statutes of
limitations;1 2 bar recovery of punitive damages, compensatory damages, or
attorney fees; 113 or bar recovery of injunctive relief.114 Although, as has been
108. See Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 8, at 85-88.
109. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1997); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974). See generally Stemlight, supra note 106, at
28-30.
110. See Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 8, at 88-90.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding a provision in Circuit City's arbitration clause unconscionable because it shortened
the applicable statute of limitations to one year); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 411 (2002) (noting that a growing number of
courts have found arbitration clauses unconscionable due to substantive remedial
restrictions, such as shortening the applicable statute of limitations).
113. For a general discussion of such clauses, see David S. Schwartz, Understanding
Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38
U.S.F. L. REv. 49 (2003).
114. See, e.g.; Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 142-43 (Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting employment arbitration provision that, inter alia, precluded employee from
recovering injunctive relief).
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discussed, courts have stricken or rewritten a number of arbitration clauses
containing these sorts of provisions, it is not easy or cheap to attack clauses on
such grounds. To the extent such clauses exist and are enforced, they may
impact plaintiffs adversely not only by diminishing their recovery, but also by
making it more difficult for them to secure legal representation. Presumably,
when attorneys make a determination as to whether to represent a particular
client, particularly on a contingent fee basis, they take into account the extent
of the client's likely recovery, if successful. To the extent that a prospective
plaintiffs relief has been substantially limited by an arbitration clause, the
individual may find it difficult or impossible to secure legal representation, and
this in turn may make it difficult or impossible for the individual to win her
case.
B. Defenses of Mandatory Arbitration from the Individual Perspective
Those who defend mandatory arbitration against claims that it is unfair to
individuals make four main points: (1) contracts of adhesion are rampant
throughout our economy and are no less appropriate with respect to procedural
issues than they are for substantive matters; (2) employees and consumers gain
better access to justice through arbitration than they would have through the
legal system; (3) courts strike down those few mandatory arbitration clauses
that overreach; and (4) it is not feasible to afford access to arbitration on a
voluntary, postdispute basis because the company and the consumer or
employee would never agree to take the same cases to arbitration, postdispute.
Each of these points is discussed briefly below.
1. Adhesive contracts are common outside arbitration
Stephen Ware has emphasized that contracts of adhesion are very common
in our economy and has urged that adhesive arbitration agreements should not
be attacked on that basis any more than we attack adhesive credit card
agreements, insurance contracts, or loan documents. 115 He points out that our
complex multijurisdictional economy could not function effectively if each
such contract were negotiated individually.116 He further observes that standard
contract law assumes consent from the formal exchange of documents and does
not require proof of actual subjective understanding.
While Ware is clearly correct that adhesive contracts are rampant and
typically enforced by courts, these facts do not justify the use of adhesive
mandatory arbitration agreements. First, although adhesive contracts are
rampant in banking, insurance, and other areas, their substantive content is also
115. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, supra note 1, at 200
(noting that adhesion contracts are typical).
116. Id. at 209-13.
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regulated by federal and/or state law.1 17 Second, it can at least be argued that it
is more inappropriate to deprive a person of access to court on a nonconsensual
basis than it is to increase their interest rate without actual subjective consent.
After all, the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the federal Constitution, and
more general access to court is assured by many state constitutions. Surely we
would not allow police to use adhesive contracts to deprive alleged criminals of
their rights to an attorney?" 18
2. Is arbitration morejust than litigation?
Samuel Estreicher has colorfully and metaphorically argued that it is better
to provide all consumers and employees a Saturn automobile than it is to allow
a few fortunate individuals to drive Cadillacs while most have no car at all. 119
He and others quite rightly point out that our litigation system is far from
perfect, and that many consumers and employees cannot afford a lawyer to
represent them in bringing their claim. 120 However, it is not clear, at least to
this author, that mandatory arbitration offers a better and more just alternative.
First, such an argument implicitly assumes that consumers and employees who
cannot afford legal assistance in court can successfully represent themselves
pro se in arbitration. Yet, this may well not be true.
Second, by compelling all consumers and employees to take their claims to
arbitration, rather than to court, companies may well be making it more
difficult than it would have been for such claimants to obtain attorneys.
Attorneys who take cases on contingent fees may well reject matters slated to
go to arbitration, rather than court, fearing that the likely lower recovery in
arbitration will not provide them with adequate compensation. 121 Particularly if
their arbitration clauses foreclose class actions, consumers and employees will
117. Ware does recognize the existence of government regulation, explaining that
regulation renders certain rights "inalienable." Id. at 206-09.
118. See generally Stemlight, supra note 60; Stemlight, supra note 81.
119. Estreicher, supra note 7.
120. See id.; Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 57 (1998).
121. It seems well recognized that the average recovery in arbitration is lower than the
average recovery in litigation. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 7, at 565 (admitting that
median compensation in employment cases is likely lower in arbitration than in litigation);
Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 105,
114-15 (2003). The disparity in non-civil rights employment cases may be smaller or
nonexistent. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DIsp. RESOL. J. 44 (2003/2004). Also,
note that one article in this Symposium takes a contrary position, urging that "there is no
evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly better in litigation" than in arbitration. David
Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical
Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1578 (2005).
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find it even tougher to obtain legal representation in arbitration than they would
have in litigation.
Third, although proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that this process
will allow more claimants to file claims against companies, it is not clear
whether more claims are indeed being filed. One credit card company, First
USA, revealed that in the two years since it implemented its mandatory
arbitration clause in early 1998, only four consumers had filed arbitration
claims against the company. 122 In contrast, First USA itself filed 51,622
arbitration claims against consumers in the same period. 123
Fourth, even if it were true that mandatory arbitration is the Saturn, why do
companies have the right to take away some consumers' and employees'
Cadillacs? That is, should it not be a legislature, rather than private companies,
that decides it is legitimate to take away some individuals' rights to boost
others' opportunities?
3. Do courts strike the worst clauses?
Defenders of mandatory arbitration have frequently argued that critics
inappropriately focus on the "few" egregiously unfair arbitration clauses. While
recognizing that some imposed arbitration agreements may be unfair, such
defenders seek to reassure as to the fairness of mandatory arbitration in general,
explaining that we can count on courts to strike down such clauses as
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. 124 The Supreme Court, similarly,
has frequently observed that state common law on unconscionability or fraud
will play an important role in protecting consumers or others from unfair
arbitration agreements. 125
While this argument may, at first glance, seem quite appealing, the
financial and other realities of litigation greatly undercut its strength. The basic
problem with the argument is that it takes a lot of time, effort, and money to
convince a court to void an arbitration clause. The burden of proof for voiding
122. See Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?: Arbitration Forum's Rulings
Called One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at El.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 119 ("Courts will only enforce
arbitration policies that provide a fair process for the adjudication of employees' statutory
rights.").
125. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (recognizing
that states have the power to void arbitration clauses on common law grounds); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) ("Of course, courts should remain
attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of
fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of
any contract."' (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
627 (1985)).
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arbitration clauses has been placed on the party challenging the clause. 12 6
Moreover, following the Supreme Court's lead, lower courts frequently state
that generalized attacks on arbitration clauses are not sufficient. 127 What all of
this means, in the real world, is that plaintiffs must build a substantial factual
record, often including expert affidavits and based on significant amounts of
discovery. 128 Many plaintiffs won't be able to afford to mount such a
challenge, and many lawyers won't agree to take on such challenges. Thus, in
the real world, even some egregiously unfair clauses may remain on the books
because plaintiffs and their attorneys lack the resources or affinity for risk to
attack them.
4. Is it infeasible to offer arbitration to individuals on a voluntary
postdispute basis?
Critics of mandatory arbitration have often suggested that if arbitration is
so great for all concerned, why not just let claimants and respondents agree to it
voluntarily, on a postdispute basis? 129 Responding to this rhetorically appealing
argument, defenders of mandatory arbitration such as Estreicher have urged
that this is a "chimerical alternative to predispute arbitration agreements," in
that in reality such agreements will almost never be negotiated. 130 Focusing on
the issue in an employment context, Estreicher explains that in a given case,
either plaintiff or defense counsel will reject arbitration in favor of litigation.
He states:
If the former employee cannot obtain counsel, it is not in the employer's
interest to offer arbitration because the lower costs of arbitration will make
more likely the pressing of a claim that otherwise simply would languish in
the administrative agency. If, on the other hand, the former employee's
economic losses are high enough to attract competent counsel, that lawyer is
exceedingly unlikely (absent unusual circumstances) to proffer arbitration
126. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000)
(refusing to void an arbitration clause based on mere "speculation" that arbitration would be
excessively costly); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (noting that generalized attacks on arbitration are
out of step with Court's strong endorsement of arbitration). But see Randolph, 531 U.S. at
92-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (urging that a company defending a clause should have the
burden of proof to defend its fairness).
127. See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Is That Arbitration Clause Unconscionable? PROVE IT!,
CONSUMER ADVOC. (Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, Washington, D.C.), July-Aug.
2002, at 1 ("Fighting a mandatory arbitration clause is not for the lazy, the meek, or those
exclusively inclined to broad abstractions. The key to success for a consumer advocate who
wishes to avoid having her client forced into a particularly unfair arbitration system is both
simple and difficult; one should put a powerful factual record before the court.").
128. Id.
129. David Schwartz has explained the differences between pre- and postdispute
agreements to arbitrate in depth. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 104-05, 110-21.
130. Estreicher, supra note 7, at 567.
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even if the lawyer would prefer not to go to trial .. for such a proffer reduces
the settlement value of the case .... 131
Estreicher's argument is troubling in two important respects. First, it takes
for granted the idea that plaintiffs with strong cases will perceive litigation to
offer a more favorable forum than arbitration. Yet, if arbitration is truly a fair
forum, better and cheaper for all, shouldn't it attract plaintiffs and their lawyers
as well as defendants? 132 In the employment area, plaintiffs' counsel have
found mediation to be a very attractive form of dispute resolution, 133 and I
suggest that they would be interested in postdispute arbitration as well, if they
were comfortable that it offered a fair outcome to their clients. Indeed,
plaintiffs' attorneys that I know, who are generally critical of mandatory
arbitration, will voluntarily take their clients to arbitration when they think that
the particular arbitration process is fair. The fact that plaintiffs' attorneys do not
choose arbitration in more disputes in my view reflects defendants' failure to
offer the process or plaintiffs' attorneys' perception that a particular process
would be less desirable for their client, rather than an inherent aversion to
arbitration in "good" cases.
Estreicher's second point, that companies would fail to offer postdispute
arbitration in disputes where they perceive a plaintiff's case to be weak in terms
of the merits or amount of damages sought, is more troubling. As Estreicher
describes the phenomenon, defendants are deliberately limiting plaintiffs to a
venue (litigation) where they will not be able to obtain a result on the merits
due to their inability to secure legal counsel. While I have no reason to question
that defendants employ this strategy, I do question Estreicher's idea that this
somehow justifies the imposition of predispute arbitration on prospective
plaintiffs by prospective defendants. If anything, defendants' strategy would
seem, to me, to justify imposing arbitration on companies in those claims
where plaintiffs and society would find arbitration preferable to litigation.
134
131. Id. at 567-68.
132. While I have often heard defense-side lawyers argue that it is plaintiffs' lawyers,
as opposed to plaintiffs, who oppose arbitration, this also does not make sense. Particularly
to the extent that plaintiffs' counsel are working on a contingent fee basis, they should be
very interested in a process that will resolve a matter quickly, so long as the result will not be
egregiously unfair.
133. For an example of a plaintiffs'-side employment lawyer's defense of mediation,
see Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Non-Binding Mediation of Employment Disputes: An ADR
Method That Is Consistent with the American Promise of Fairness, ALI-ABA CLE COURSE
OF STUDY, Feb. 25, 1998, at 1301.
134. I make this suggestion somewhat tongue in cheek. Politically, such a proposal
would never be enacted in our current Congress. Constitutionally, companies could claim
that such an imposition violated their jury trial rights. Yet, from a policy standpoint, I think
the idea is quite defensible. If society has decided that arbitration can be a better dispute-
resolution forum than litigation, and if plaintiffs are eager to resolve disputes in that forum,
why should defendants be permitted to insist on litigation as a means of preventing
plaintiffs' disputes from ever being resolved?
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Yet, I suspect that this form of "mandatory arbitration" would not be supported
by those who have advocated allowing companies to impose arbitration on their
consumers and employees.
Voluntary postdispute arbitration is not impossible. Indeed, in other
countries such as Great Britain, consumers do voluntarily arbitrate disputes
with various companies. 135 Thus, rather than dismiss the possibility of
voluntary postdispute arbitration, we should consider what changes or
regulations might be necessary to make this a reality in the United States.
C. Empirical Studies of the Effect of Mandatory Arbitration on Individuals
Many of the disputes outlined above cry out for empirical studies. Both
critics and defenders of mandatory arbitration make assertions that, while
empirical in nature, are founded on gut-level beliefs rather than on actual data.
Unfortunately, researchers have found it very difficult to evaluate mandatory
arbitration, for a number of reasons. First, to a large extent, researchers cannot
obtain access to the data they need to perform good studies. As we have seen,
one of the fundamental traits of arbitration is that it is typically private. Thus,
researchers can only obtain data on arbitration to the extent that disputants or
arbitration providers make the data available, which they often do not. A
second problem researchers face is that even if they had data regarding results
of claims filed in arbitration and in court, it would be difficult to know how to
compare that data. After all, the same case is never brought in both processes,
and one cannot simply assume that claims brought in arbitration were otherwise
identical to those brought in litigation. Third, to the extent researchers look
only at who wins or loses and how much they obtain when a claim goes to
triallarbitration, they are missing a large part of the dispute resolution picture.
Specifically, it seems likely that the choice between arbitration and litigation
may also affect such things as whether a disputant can obtain a lawyer, whether
a disputant chooses to bring a claim at all, whether a claim settles (and if so, for
how much), and whether a claim is resolved by motion prior to a hearing.
Studies that focus only on results at trial as compared to arbitration miss this
bigger picture. For example, as noted above, one credit card company's
statistics showed that in the two years after it imposed mandatory arbitration,
only four customers filed claims against the company. In contrast, during that
same period the company brought 51,622 arbitration claims against
consumers. 136 In short, focusing exclusively on results achieved in arbitration
135. For a description of several programs or "schemes" for consumer arbitration
sponsored by the British Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, see Chartered Inst. of Arbitrators,
Welcome to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, at http://www.arbitrators.org (last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
136. Mayer, supra note 122 (discussing policy implemented in early 1998).
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as compared to litigation obscures many of the important differences that may
exist when disputes are funneled to one approach or the other.
The only published consumer arbitration studies of which this author is
aware examine securities arbitration. Securities arbitration is more public than
most forms of consumer arbitration and is also governmentally regulated. The
consumers involved with securities arbitration are presumably wealthier than
many consumers. Thus, although the availability of data permits the study of
securities arbitration, big questions exist as to whether it is proper to assume
that securities arbitration results are applicable in other areas. Several studies
done by the General Accounting Office and others show that customers win
slightly more than fifty percent of their claims against brokers. 137 While this
sounds promising, several caveats must be noted. First, although investors
prevail, they may be awarded just a small percentage of the relief to which they
claim they were entitled. 138 Second, even to the extent investors win at
arbitration, they may not be able collect on their awards. 139 Third, investors
may need to secure legal representation to have a chance of making a good
recovery. 14 0 Fourth, one study has shown that repeat player brokers tended to
do better in arbitration than those companies that had less experience with the
arbitration process. 14 1
Some empirical studies have also been done on employment arbitration,
but the results here are inconclusive as well. For example, Lisa Bingham's
study of employment arbitration has shown that repeat player companies gain
an advantage in arbitration, but that the voluntary imposition of fairness
requirements through due process protocols may diminish this advantage. 142
137. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONs NEEDED TO
ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 23 (2000) (reporting that investors prevailed 51% of
the time between 1992 and 1996) [hereinafter 2000 GAO REPORT]; GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORs FARE 7 (1992) (stating that
approximately 60% of investors prevail); Public Customer Award Survey, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, May 1996, at 1, 3 (stating that investors prevail 54% of the time). See
generally Richard A. Voytas, Jr., Empirical Evidence of Worsening Conditions for the
Investor in Securities Arbitration, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 2002, at 1, 5 (showing
decline in investors' rate of success from 1992 to 2000).
138. Several recent studies show that investors who prevail win approximately twenty-
five percent of the amount they sought. See, e.g., Voytas, supra note 137, at 5. However, it is
also true that investors may be claiming more than the amount to which they are really
entitled.
139. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 137, for an extensive discussion of this
problem.
140. See Voytas, supra note 137, at 7 (showing represented investors did substantially
better than nonrepresented investors).
141. See id. at 6 (showing that brokers who are repeat players did significantly better
than non-repeat player brokers both in defending themselves against investor claims and also
in bringing counterclaims against investors).
142. See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 873, 893-97 (2002).
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On the other hand, a study comparing litigated nondiscrimination employment
claims to those arbitrated before the AAA found that higher-level employees
(those most likely to have negotiated arbitration clauses rather than have had
them imposed upon them) received similar results in both fora. 143 However, the
study was careful to note that the results might well not be generalizable to
other types of claims or claims brought before other arbitrators, and further
recognized many of the methodological problems noted above.
Frustrated by the lack of data on consumer arbitrations, the California
Legislature recently mandated that all arbitration providers keep and publish
certain information regarding arbitrations that they administer. 144 At least two
major providers, the AAA and JAMS, have now published reports pursuant to
this legislation, as have two providers (Kaiser Health and Alternative
Resolution Centers) more focused on California. 145 Once analyzed, this data
may help us to learn about the percentage of consumer and employment
arbitration claims that are settled or withdrawn prior to a ruling, the percentage
that are resolved through a paper hearing rather than live testimony, the
percentage in which consumers and employees are represented by attorneys,
the respective win rates of represented and unrepresented consumers and
employees, and the fees charged by arbitrators in such cases and by whom they
are paid.
143. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 121, at 44-55; see also Estreicher et al., supra note
121 (summarizing prior empirical studies on employment arbitration and concluding that
while arbitration is clearly faster than litigation, more research needs to be done regarding
plaintiffs' relative rates of success and damages awards in litigation and arbitration). In this
author's view, the Estreicher et al. article oversimplifies the limited information that can be
taken from existing studies on employment arbitration by failing adequately to distinguish
between nonstatutory claims of highly paid employees and statutory discrimination claims
often brought by lower-pay employees. The fact that arbitration may prove to be a fair venue
for the former claims says little or nothing about the adequacy of arbitration for the latter set
of claims.
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West Supp. 2005).
145. The AAA data is available at Am. Arbitration Ass'n, CA Provider Organization
Report, at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22442 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). The JAMS data
is available at JAMS, Consumer Arbitration-JAMS Disclosures for California Consumer
Arbitrations, at http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/consumer-arbitrationdata.asp (last
visited Mar. 19, 2005). The Kaiser data is available at Office of the Independent
Administrator, Disclosures by the Office of the Independent Administrator, at
http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/oia/Disclosures.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). The
Alternative Resolution Centers data is available at Alternative Resolution Ctrs., Consumer
Arbitration Reporting, at http://www.arc4adr.com/car.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
Another provider, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), is being sued by consumer groups
for its failure to provide information required by California law in Corbett v. National
Arbitration Forum, No. 04-431430 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 17, 2004). Press Release, Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice, TLPJ Charges National Arbitration Forum with Violating CA
Disclosure Law (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.tlpj.org/pr/naf_051704.htm.
However, NAF has made some data available on its website. See Nat'l Arbitration Forum,
Consumer ADR Proceedings in California, at http://www.arbitration-
forum.com/focus/consumers/caconsumer.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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Unfortunately, even the California data will not enable us to analyze what
happened in those consumer and employment arbitration claims that were
settled or withdrawn. Nor can the California data help us examine those claims
that were never brought, perhaps because the consumer could not get a lawyer
or did not think her likelihood of success was sufficient. It seems that we will
not soon be able to resolve the debate over mandatory arbitration using
empirical studies.
III. THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION
A. The Public Justice Critique
The most significant attacks on mandatory binding arbitration relate to its
effect on society as a whole, rather than to its effect on individual consumers or
employees. Even if it could be shown that mandatory arbitration were
beneficial for many or potentially all consumers and employees who had
claims, some argue it would still be detrimental to society in that it curtails the
use of public (sometimes jury) trials and eliminates the development of public
precedent. 14 6 As a corollary, such critics note that to the extent mandatory
arbitration eliminates class actions, it also diminishes the public's opportunity
to use the public justice system to enforce public laws. 147
The "public justice" critique is founded on the underlying principle that
society as a whole benefits from public exposition of the law. William Landes
and Richard Posner famously explained that the public aspects of our justice
system can be viewed as a "public good."'14 8 From an economics standpoint,
146. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as Private Good,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235-40, 261 (1979) (arguing, from a law and economics perspective,
that adjudication is a public good in that it not only resolves disputes but also creates rules of
law needed to promote social compliance therewith, and that the public good of precedent is
likely to be underproduced in the private dispute resolution market); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
395, 426-27 (1999) (emphasizing that, in contrast to arbitration, civil litigation not only
resolves disputes but also "generates specific and general deterrence, educates the public,
creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values"); Clyde W. Summers,
Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 703-11 (2004) (critiquing mandatory arbitration in part
because it erodes public knowledge and precedent); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose
It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 98 (suggesting that
by deemphasizing courts' role in resolving disputes through litigation, "we run the risk of
finding ourselves without an institution that has the political legitimacy to make fact- and
law-based decisions when we need them"); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at
279 (arguing that mandatory arbitration threatens democratic values).
147. See Stemlight, supra note 106.
148. Economists explain that a public good exhibits two closely related characteristics:
(1) consumption is nonrivalrous, meaning that consumption of the good by one person does
not reduce the amount available for any other consumer; and (2) it is nonexcludable,
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we cannot count on the private market (arbitration) to provide this public good,
because although it benefits the public at large, private parties may not find it
cost-effective to pay for the good. As David Luban has succinctly explained,
"Why would litigants who engage the services of a rent-a-judge want to pay
extra for a reasoned opinion enunciating a rule that benefits only future
litigants?" 14 9
What, specifically, are the public goods that are served by the public
litigation system? Two primary categories of such goods can be described as
"rule of law" and "public education."
From a rule of law standpoint, we hope that our public litigation system
will ensure predictable, fair, and consistent interpretation of the society's laws.
The fundamental premises of the "rule of law" are that similarly situated
persons should be treated similarly under the law and that persons of privilege
or influence should not receive special treatment. To the extent the system is
fair and consistent, public trust in the system of justice will be enhanced,
thereby serving another public good.150
Our public litigation system performs an educative function as well. By
making court hearings open to the public and by publishing judges' reasoned
written opinions, we inform not only the parties but also the public at large
regarding how the laws are being interpreted. That is, our public court hearings
educate the public and potential wrongdoers as to how the law is being
interpreted, thereby deterring potential wrongdoers from violating the law,
educating victims as to their rights, and inviting the public to take action to help
reform the law should it not be satisfied with the public results. As well, the
public justice system may discover and publicize facts, and this information can
then be used in our legal and political system.15 1 The popular phrasing is that
the public benefits from processes being "transparent."
The argument that our public litigation system serves these public purposes
has been spelled out in detail elsewhere. For example, one well-known body of
articles contrasts the litigation and negotiation of disputes and argues that
negotiated resolution of disputes fails to provide public benefits offered by
litigation. Owen Fiss has been one of the primary figures in spelling out the
meaning that once the good has been provided to some consumers, it is very
difficult/prohibitively expensive to exclude other (nonpaying) consumers from consuming it.
The presence of a public good causes market failure, in that the market will undersupply the
good. Classic examples include national defense and research on a technology for which
patent protection is not perfect. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUNINFELD,
MICROECONOMICs 609, 665-71 (6th ed. 2005).
149. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2622 (1995) (suggesting that settlements, as well as arbitration, will underproduce public
goods, including not only rules and precedents but also publication of facts and fostering of
faith in the judicial system).
150. Id. at 2625.
151. Id.
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benefits of litigation in contrast to negotiation.' 52 Judith Resnik, similarly, has
often written of the benefits of our public adjudicative system, not merely for
individual disputants, but also for the larger society.153
Although it seems well recognized that public litigation provides a public
good, there is less agreement as to whether alternative forms of dispute
resolution might also serve these same public interests or perhaps provide other
public goods. The literature comparing negotiated and litigated solutions is
divided on this issue. Fiss's important article Against Settlement emphasizes the
dangers of allowing too many disputes to be resolved through settlement rather
than through public litigation.
However, Luban, building on Fiss's work, urges that while public
adjudication serves public interests, negotiation, too, can potentially serve such
interests. He urges that "the settlement process can realize some of the values
Fiss and I both find in adjudication. These include openness, legal justice, and
the creation of public goods."' 154 Thus, concludes Luban, "We cannot really be
against settlements; nor can we really be against settlements that vastly
outnumber adjudications. But we can be against the wrong settlements. ' 15 5 For
Luban the "wrong" settlements are those that are secret.156
Carrie Menkel-Meadow goes one step beyond Luban, urging that
settlements, even secret settlements, can potentially serve important public
interests that are not served by litigation. In particular, settlement can promote
such values as "consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy
and emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access,
and yes, even justice." 157 Explaining that "both categories of 'settlement' and
'adjudication' contain enough variation within them to make them almost
meaningless concepts to compare in the abstract," 15 8 Menkel-Meadow points
out that settlements need not be mere unseemly compromises, that settlements
152. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (emphasizing
that "[clivil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a
recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals"); Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-44 (1979) (emphasizing the importance of judges' role in engaging in
public factfinding and imposing regulatory obligations).
153. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494 (1986) (examining emerging hostility toward adjudication and urging
preservation of the accomplishments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Judith Resnik,
For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 173, 200 (2003) (arguing that the last century has seen the triumph of
adjudication but also its demise, through growth of ADR and administrative process, and
that "[a]djudication's supporters need to return to their claims for adjudication and ask how
adjudication can be refashioned to deliver its promises more broadly").
154. Luban, supra note 149, at 2620.
155. Id. at 2662.
156. Id. at 2648-62.
157. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669-70 (1995).
158. Id. at2671.
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can focus on important nonmonetary issues that would be neglected in
litigation, and that settlements potentially achieve results that are more fair than
a winner-take-all solution might be. 159
Rather surprisingly, only a few commentators have focused directly on
whether arbitration in general or mandatory arbitration in particular is
consistent with public justice. Looking specifically at arbitration with respect to
employment discrimination claims, Geraldine Moohr points out that our
employment discrimination statutes are intended to "achieve the public goal of
eliminating discrimination in the workplace."' 160 She then points out that
litigation, as compared to arbitration, is more effective in achieving this goal by
deterring employers from violating the law, educating the public, creating
precedent, developing uniform law, and forming public values. 16 1
Richard Reuben makes a far more general argument, examining whether
arbitration is democratic. 162 He urges that mandatory arbitration, in particular,
is inconsistent with important democratic values. He explains that while
arbitration in general has a "contingent" democratic character, and indeed has
the capacity to "enhance democratic governance" by both achieving efficiency
gains and augmenting personal autonomy, 163 the mandatory version of
arbitration diminishes democracy by, for example, providing little
accountability, limiting transparency, providing substantial discretion that does
not demand rationality, and failing to provide equal protection or due
process. 164
Clearly, when disputes are resolved in private settings, such as binding
arbitration, typically neither public access 165 nor public precedent are
assured. 166 But, does this matter, and, if so, when does it matter? This privacy
causes greater concern when the subjects handled in arbitration affect public
interests. That is, we care more when federal statutory claims such as
159. Id. at 2672-75.
160. Moohr, supra note 146, at 399.
161. Id. at 426-39.
162. Reuben, supra note 146.
163. Id. at 295-97.
164. Id. at 298-303.
165. It is not impossible to envision an arbitration that would be open to the public.
Indeed, some arbitrations involving public agencies have been public. However, the vast
majority of arbitrations are handled privately, and such privacy is vaunted as one of the
major advantages of arbitration over litigation. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Using
Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6 (citing privacy as one of the
significant advantages of arbitration).
166. Similarly, some few arbitrations do lead to decisions that are publicly available to
a greater or lesser degree. Some labor arbitration decisions are published and even made
available through online databases. Also, securities arbitration decisions are filed with public
agencies and sometimes available online as well. However, the securities arbitration
decisions usually contain too little analysis to be useful as precedent, and the labor
arbitration decisions are simply an exception to the norm of private unpublished arbitration
decisions.
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employment discrimination are taken away from the public eye than when a
dispute over the quality of soybeans shipped from Missouri to Nevada is
handled privately.
B. Rethinking the Public Justice Critique
1. Why rethink?
This public justice critique is significant and indeed has been espoused in
the past by this author. In multiple articles, I have pointed out that mandatory
binding arbitration potentially deprives persons of their jury trial rights,
although courts have not typically seen fit to test arbitration clauses under the
traditional jury waiver standards. 167 In another article, I critique those
mandatory arbitration clauses that would deprive persons of the opportunity to
pursue public justice using class actions. 168 And, yet another article observes
that where a society becomes too heavily dependent on informal private forms
of dispute resolution, such as mediation, it jeopardizes law enforcement
opportunities made available by litigation. 169
Nonetheless, it is appropriate in this author's opinion to reopen and rethink
the question of whether a private arbitral system of justice is truly unjust, or
whether such a system is simply inconsistent with the way we have typically
done things in the United States. That is, I challenge the critics of mandatory
arbitration, such as myself, to take a step back and reconsider whether, and if so
why, mandatory consumer and employment arbitration is truly unjust.
I embark on this mission based on the recognition that the features of a
justice system that have been eliminated by mandatory arbitration may not, in
fact, be essential for a legal system to be just. That is, not all societies' legal
systems feature public trials, reasoned written public precedent, or class
actions. Do we critics of mandatory arbitration really mean to say that all such
"deficient" legal systems are unjust? Thinking globally and historically about
justice systems, it is clear that public trials and published written precedent are
a relatively recent phenomenon. Do we really mean to say that all preexisting
legal systems that lacked these features were unjust, and that for as long as
humans exist on this planet we must use public adversarial trials and reasoned
published precedent in order to resolve our disputes? Surely such a proposition
proves too much.
167. See Stemlight, supra note 60; Sternlight, supra note 56; Stemlight, supra note 81.
168. See Sternlight, supra note 106.
169. See Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1401 (2004).
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2. Back to fundamentals
The task of setting out the fundamentals of a system of justice is daunting,
and I will not purport to do anything but commence this important project.
Others have spent books and lifetimes trying to define justice. 170 Yet, I believe
I can make some advance in the discussion of mandatory arbitration by setting
out even a few preliminary ideas.
Those who have tried to define justice have typically recognized that
justice has many aspects, and I too believe this is critical. Indeed, I will present
here two sets of multifactor theories of justice: those that distinguish
procedural, substantive, and reconciliatory aspects of justice; and those that
distinguish individual from more public justice. Each of these perspectives is
useful, and the two sets of theories should be overlaid on one another. Ideally a
system of justice will serve all of these needs, although I believe there are
inevitable tensions among these goals.171
Procedural, substantive, and reconciliatory justice. As I have briefly
discussed elsewhere, 172 justice systems ought to serve three sets of interests:
procedural, substantive, and reconciliatory. The idea of substantive or
distributive justice requires little exposition for these purposes. While we all
may have different conceptions of substantive justice, we all agree that the
results of any system of justice are critically important in determining whether
that system is indeed "just." If a single party or group were to win all disputes,
if equally situated persons received disparate results, or if the "justice" system
led to increasingly unequal division of resources, few if any of us would feel
that justice had been served.
The procedural aspect of justice is also well recognized. Social
psychologists such as Tom Tyler 173 have done some terrific work in recent
years emphasizing that the procedural aspects of justice are as important as the
substantive, at least from the perspective of disputants. Drawing upon
170. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (setting out a theory of
political justice based on a "veil of ignorance"); JoHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)
(critiquing own prior views); JoHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin
Kelly ed., 2001) (reformulating earlier book based on later insights).
171. See Sternlight, supra note 169.
172. Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003).
173. Much of the key work in this area has been done by Laurens Walker, John
Thibaut, E. Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler, and their students or former students. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E.
Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness
as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 224, 247 (1993); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural
Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton
eds., 2001); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of
Adjudication, 4 J. App. SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974).
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laboratory and field research, this work has shown that perceptions of
procedural justice are more influential than perceptions of distributive justice
with respect to how disputants will assess the fairness and legitimacy of the
entire system. 174 As Nancy Welsh explains, procedural justice researchers have
found three key elements to disputants' experience of procedural justice: (1)
their perception that they had an opportunity to voice their concerns and present
evidence to a third party, and that they had some control over this presentation;
(2) their perception that the third party actually considered these concerns; and
(3) their perception that they were treated in a dignified and respectful
manner. 
175
In my view, it may also be appropriate to ask our systems of justice to
serve a third and more controversial purpose: reconciliation. While Western
post-Enlightenment societies have typically emphasized that the main point of a
justice system is to apply publicly selected laws and rights in a fair and just
manner, 176 other visions of justice are also possible. Non-Western European
societies have frequently counted on their system of justice to help create
balance, harmony, or reconciliation among the members of the society. 177
174. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 860 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Making
Deals] (arguing that court-connected third-party processes "should and must be judged
against the standard of procedural justice"); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision
Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice,
2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 180 [hereinafter Welsh, Hollow Promise]; Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price
of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 78-92 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh,
Thinning Vision] (suggesting steps that should be taken to ensure that mediation enhances
rather than diminishes self-determination, a component asserted by procedural justice studies
to be imperative to the perception of a fair process).
175. Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 174, at 820; see also Hensler, supra note 146, at
84-95 (drawing on procedural justice literature to suggest that the move to use mandatory
court-connected mediation has been based on a false theory that litigants prefer
nonadversarial methods of dispute resolution, when in actuality litigants prefer to have their
disputes resolved on the basis of fact and law by a neutral third party).
176. Stemlight, supra note 172, at 300.
177. For example, James Wall and Ronda Callister have described the Ho'oponopono
process, which they call "an integral and ancient part of Polynesian culture," and which later
migrated to Hawaii. James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Ho'oponopono: Some
Lessons from Hawaiian Mediation, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 45, 46 (1995). This process, used to
resolve all manner of interpersonal and what would elsewhere be criminal matters, typically
consists of twelve steps ultimately geared to untangle the disputants and make things right
between them. Id. at 47-52. Similarly, in describing the Navajo system of justice, Robert
Yazzie explains that concepts of justice are closely related to concepts of healing and that
when Navajo describe law, they say "life comes from it." Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From
It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 1994 N.M. L. REv. 175, 177-87 (explaining that the Navajo
system of justice can best be described as "horizontal," in contrast to the Western "vertical"
system of justice; where the vertical system relies on hierarchy and power to resolve
disputes, the horizontal is instead best symbolized by the circle, in which no authority has to
determine what is true, and the goal is healing and restoration rather than determining right
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While many have suggested that such an emphasis on harmony or
reconciliation may not be appropriate or even possible in a modem Western
society, 178 and others have urged that harmony has negative controlling
aspects, 179 as well as a potential positive allure, I see no reason why an
emphasis on protection of rights has to be exclusive of an emphasis on
improving relations among members of society. 180 Yet, as this view is
controversial and not essential to analyzing whether systems of mandatory
arbitration are just, I will not explore it further at this time.
Public and private purposes of a justice system. An alternative way to cut
the justice pie is to distinguish between individual and public interests in
justice. This perspective is similar to that taken by such scholars as Fiss and
Luban, and has been examined earlier. 181 However, whereas Fiss and Luban
seemingly elevated public over private interests, implying that only the public
interests warrant being identified with "justice," my own perspective is closer
to that of Menkel-Meadow, who urges that individuals' interests, and especially
their rights to autonomy and self-determination, are also entitled to
consideration in designing a system of justice that serves the public interest.
Thus, in a prior article focused on what kinds of dispute resolution systems are
most appropriate to resolve employment discrimination claims, I urged that we
need to take account of not only societal interests such as interpreting public
laws, applying them equally, and shaping future behavior in accordance with
those laws, but also individual interests in, for example, speedy decisions, low-
cost and accessible processes, private results (at times), and procedural
fairness. 182 1 urged in that article that no single procedure can likely serve all of
these interests, and that societies are often best off providing multiple processes
including, for example, the use of formal litigation for some disputes (to serve
the public interests in lawmaking, consistency of results, deterrence, etc.) and
private, nonadversarial processes such as mediation for others (to serve private
interests in speedy, low-cost, accessible processes). 183 The difficulty, of course,
and wrong). Through a process of talking, and community, the Navajo seek to work things
out as a community. Id. at 180-87.
178. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Introduction to 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (arguing that the characteristics of informal justice in
precapitalist societies demonstrate why comparable institutions cannot be created under
Western capitalism, in that the precapitalist society features a social structure in which
relationships are multiplex and continuous, in which residential mobility is limited, and in
which reputation is highly prized and easily lost).
179. See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy
and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 1 (1993).
180. Sternlight, supra note 172, at 302.
181. See supra Part III.A.
182. Stemlight, supra note 169, at 1482-89.
183. Id. at 1490-99.
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is that the society must also create a "switching mechanism" to select among
these multiple dispute resolution tracks. 184
3. So, is formal litigation necessary to achieve justice?
Having briefly laid out these multiple visions of justice, we must then ask
whether formal litigation as we know it today in the United States is necessary
to achieve the kinds of justice described above. This Article boldly asserts it is
not.
First, formal litigation is not necessary to achieve distributive or
substantive justice. Tribal societies, communes, families, and many other
groups manage to distribute resources and resolve disputes without using
formal courts, public precedent, class actions, or discovery. Instead, such
groups may use forms of mediation or arbitration to resolve their disputes.
While individual results can of course be challenged, it seems impossibly
narrow-minded to assert that none of these informal dispute resolution
mechanisms can achieve substantive justice.
Second, it also seems clear that informal dispute resolution mechanisms
can meet procedural justice concerns. Welsh has recently made this point
clearly, with respect to mediation. She explains that mediation, if properly
designed, can allow disputants all the elements of procedural justice:
opportunity to voice their concerns and present evidence to a third party,
provision of some control over this presentation, consideration of the concerns
by the third party, and a dignified and respectful forum. 185 While Welsh
certainly does not assert that mediation always meets procedural justice
concerns, she does show that nonlitigation approaches are capable of making
disputants feel that their concerns have been heard and that they have been
treated fairly and with dignity. 186 Again, even a cursory familiarity with
nonlitigation approaches used by other societies supports this point, as clearly
not all societies have felt it necessary to establish formal discovery, public
precedent, or even an adversarial system in order for their members to feel they
have received treatment that is procedurally just.
Third, we certainly cannot say that the formal litigation system is essential
to the fulfillment of individuals' interest in a speedy, low-cost, potentially
private decisionmaking process. Indeed, the expense, slow speed, and high cost
of our formal litigation system is well documented, and causes many to
question whether indeed our high aspirations for formal justice cause injustice
184. Id. at 1495-98.
185. Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 174, at 792; see also Welsh, Hollow Promise,
supra note 174; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 174. But see Hensler, supra note 146, at
94 (arguing that litigation is better than mediation in meeting procedural justice concerns).
186. Indeed, Welsh recognizes that many court-connected mediation programs do not
meet these concerns.
1669April 2005]
HeinOnline -- 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1669 2004-2005
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
for those who either cannot access the system or are dragged through it at high
cost.
Finally, we must even question whether our formal litigation system is
necessary to achieve the public purposes of a justice system: rule of law,
transparency, adherence to social norms, etc. This is the claim that is the most
plausible, and the critiques of ADR offered by such scholars as Fiss and Luban
seem to depend on this inherent assumption. Yet, while it seems clear that
litigation can serve these important public interests, it also seems clear that
other modes of dispute resolution can also provide similar justice, at least in
some types of societies. Let us look, for example, at the Navajo system of
peacemaking described by Judge Robert Yazzie. 187 As Yazzie explains, the
Navajo rely on a system of justice whereby disputants and their families and
friends gather before a tribal elder who helps them reach a mutually acceptable
solution. This leader invites the disputants to share their mutual concerns and
look for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem that will ensure peace
within the society. The leader also uses his or her influence to shape a solution
that is consistent with community norms. 188
While the Navajo system of justice is a far cry from our own, and does not
use written published precedent, it does achieve many of the same ends as our
own formal litigation process. The Navajo dispute resolution process is open to
the public, in the sense that interested family and friends are able to participate.
Although the process is not focused on "law" as we know it, participating
parties no doubt insist on fair treatment. As the results of other peacemaking
meetings are known to the community, it is likely that a great deal of
consistency will exist between results achieved in various meetings. Further,
these informal processes would seem to be extremely effective in shaping the
conduct of members of the society. In a small community, results of tribal
peacemaking will quickly become public, and will be very important in
ensuring that other community members are deterred from similar conduct that
is inconsistent with community norms (law). As well, to the extent the
community believes that the results of the peacemaking were not proper, steps
can be taken to reshape the communal norms. In short, without the formality or
written decisions of litigation, many if not all of the norms of public justice can
be met.
4. Then is mandatory arbitration just?
If a formal litigation system is not the only possible just system of dispute
resolution, what happens to the public justice critique of mandatory arbitration?
This Part asks not whether mandatory arbitration is ever unjust, but rather
whether it can ever be just. The question of whether mandatory arbitration is
187. Yazzie, supra note 177.
188. Id. at 180-87.
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ever unjust is too easy. Clearly, mandatory arbitration, indeed like litigation or
mediation or any other form of dispute resolution, can be set up in such a way
as to be unjust. Where the arbitrators are biased or the remedies are limited,
mandatory (or nonmandatory) arbitration can potentially be unjust according to
any of the factors set out above. It may potentially generate results that are
substantively unfair, prevent participants from adequately participating and
expressing their views, prevent disputes from being handled quickly and
efficiently, and certainly prevent the public at large from obtaining access to
the dispute resolution process or its results.
Thus, the far more interesting question is whether mandatory arbitration
can ever be just. It will be examined in light of the various features of justice
systems outlined above.
First, can mandatory arbitration be consistent with procedural justice? This
is a difficult question. It seems clear that arbitration, when chosen voluntarily,
can offer disputants the opportunity to voice their perspectives, to have their
views fairly considered, and to be treated with dignity. Indeed, many might
argue that the arbitration process potentially offers more voice and more
dignity than litigation, in that it can be less formal and less dominated by
attorneys.
Yet, does the manner in which arbitration is imposed affect the perceived
procedural justice of the process? While I can offer no empirical studies in
support of this proposition, I believe that it does. When one party designs a
process and then imposes it on another, thereby depriving that party of access
to the default dispute resolution mechanism chosen by society (here, litigation),
I believe this will naturally, if not inevitably, raise concerns that the imposed
process is unfair. Even if the process which is being forced is itself "fair," the
forcing of that process on one side by the other raises the concern, from a
procedural justice standpoint, that the process is tainted. This seems to be basic
psychology.189
Second, can mandatory arbitration be consistent with substantive or
distributive justice? Here, the picture is again mixed. It is clear that the drafters
of mandatory arbitration programs have an incentive to design the process so as
to be beneficial to themselves, from a substantive standpoint. As we have seen,
189. Lisa Bingham raises this concern from a somewhat different perspective when she
discusses the macrodesign issues relevant to developing dispute resolution processes. A
process that is by nature noncoercive, such as mediation, becomes more coercive if imposed
involuntarily. Bingham, supra note 102. The phenomenon of "reactive devaluation" offers a
sort of analogy. Psychologist Lee Ross and others have observed that people tend to devalue
proposals that are authored by an adversary. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation
and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.
eds., 1995). Here, it is natural that disputants would think less of a procedural process that is
mandated by an adversary. Cf Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1593, 1623 (2005) (critiquing the mandatory imposition of ADR processes,
and observing that forced ADR "is deeply disturbing to many litigants").
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the drafters may include clauses that eliminate potential forms of relief, shorten
statutes of limitations, or eliminate the possibility of class actions. 190 Each of
these approaches (and others) is geared to benefit the drafter, substantively, at
the expense of the person on whom the clause is imposed. While courts may
strike down some of the worst such clauses on unconscionability or other
grounds, not all plaintiffs will bring, much less win, such challenges. Thus, as a
group, mandatory arbitration schemes may well be substantively unjust as
compared to litigation. Yet, while it is evident that a mandatory arbitration
scheme can be designed to be unfair, and to lead to skewed results, it seems
equally clear that individual arbitrators can be nonbiased and issue
substantively fair decisions, even where the arbitration was imposed
involuntarily. And, it also must be recognized that litigation poses problems of
lack of justice that can lead to significant substantive injustice. Thus, it seems
that mandatory arbitration sometimes but certainly not always leads to
substantive or distributive injustice.
Third, with respect to what I have identified as the "individual justice"
factors, the picture is also complex. In terms of such features as speed, cost, and
privacy, arbitration, even the mandatory version, may offer a superior result to
many disputants. However, to the extent that autonomy is also considered one
of the aspects of "individual justice"-and Menkel-Meadow urges that it
should be 19 1-mandatory arbitration's score with respect to "individual justice"
must fall substantially. Individuals who have been forced out of one process
(litigation) into another (arbitration) have lost rather than gained autonomy.
Fourth, let us again consider the public justice factors, such as support for
rule of law, development of public precedent, and shaping of public conduct.
Here, the extent to which mandatory arbitration is consistent with public justice
will depend on the manner in which it is structured. If, as is typically the case,
the mandatory arbitrations are required to be closed to the public, if the results
are usually not reasoned, and if those awards are almost always confidential
and rarely published, public justice is not served. In contrast not only to
litigation but also to the Navajo peacemaking process, private arbitration does
not serve an educative function in society. Private proceedings and private
awards offer no opportunity for nondisputants to learn from what happened, nor
is there an incentive for arbitrators to follow precedent or develop a body of
decisions consistent with the rule of law. That is, in considering whether
mandatory arbitration is consistent with public justice we see that the problem
is not its mandatory nature but rather its private aspect.
190. See Sternlight, supra note 106.
191. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 157, at 2684.
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CONCLUSION
What, then, has been learned from this lengthy examination of mandatory
arbitration? Readers will not be surprised, given both the title of this Article
and this author's prior work, that I have concluded that mandatory binding
arbitration is unjust in several aspects. Specifically, the mandatory nature of
mandatory arbitration impinges on substantive, procedural, and individual
justice, and the private nature of mandatory arbitration impinges on the public
purposes that ought to be served by a justice system. Yet, I believe several
additional key insights can be drawn that may help us as we continually strive
to better our system of justice.
First, mandatory arbitration is not unjust simply because it is not litigation,
but rather because of its own core features. We have seen that other
nonlitigation systems (e.g., Navajo peacemaking) could be just, even though
they are far different from litigation. This insight is important, because it means
that our society need not remain wedded to adversarial litigation as it exists in
the twenty-first century. Rather, as our society develops we can explore other
forms of justice that might meet our various concerns, even if in a way quite
different from that which we are used to.
Second, we can begin to think about ways to modify mandatory arbitration
to make it more just. It is tempting to assert that the problem with mandatory
arbitration is that it is mandatory. Yet, I think this is too simple. A brief
consideration of a couple of thought experiments may help us see why it is so
important to be specific about the problems that underlie mandatory arbitration.
For our first thought experiment, suppose Congress imposed a dispute
resolution system less formal than litigation, but under which the
decisionmakers were picked and paid by the government. 192 I believe such a
process would be far more "just" than privately imposed mandatory arbitration
as considered under many of the types of justice outlined above. Perhaps it
might even compare favorably to litigation.
From a procedural justice standpoint, although the arbitration/
administrative process would be imposed, it would be imposed by the society
as a whole rather than by an opposing party. Thus, just as we don't complain
that litigation is inherently unjust because it is "forced," so too would this
complaint about governmentally mandated arbitration fade away.
With respect to substantive or distributive justice, if such arbitration or
administrative process were governmentally rather than privately mandated,
private parties would lose much, if not most, of the opportunity they now have
to skew the process in their own favor. While they might influence
appointments informally, through lobbying, private parties would not have the
direct power to appoint decisionmakers nor to devise the criteria for their
192. That is, Congress might send all disputes to a process that looks like what we call
administrative law or what some other countries call "arbitration."
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selection. Thus, there seems no reason to believe that substantive justice would
necessarily be served less well than it is currently served by litigation. Indeed,
perhaps decreased costs and formality would actually improve access to
substantive justice.
Considering private justice factors, such as speed and cost but also
autonomy, the governmentally mandated arbitration might pass muster as well.
Although parties would be mandated to arbitrate, rather than litigate, this seems
no worse than our current system, which mandates litigation as the default
process. Parties would still have the autonomy to choose to settle or mediate
their disputes, if they preferred. To the extent that this arbitration would be a
less formal version of litigation, akin to an administrative hearing perhaps, it
might offer greater speed, cost, and access than is currently available through
litigation.
As for public justice factors, such as precedent, rule of law, and so forth,
the legitimacy of this hypothetical governmentally imposed arbitration would
depend on whether the hearings were open and whether the results were
published. Private "justice" is truly problematic, for the secret proceedings
inherently threaten a society's ability to enforce its norms and ensure that
equally situated persons are treated equally. On the other hand, it is not clear to
this author that all kinds of decisions must be made and decided publicly.
Rather, to the extent that our various visions of justice are in tension with one
another, we must devise an array of processes to meet our various concerns.
Perhaps some kinds of disputes are better made privately, in order to promote
various aspects of individual justice.
As a second thought experiment, what if arbitration, much as we know it
today, were imposed "mandatorily," but by Congress rather than by private
parties? That is, what if Congress eliminated publicly appointed judges and
required some or all disputes to be brought to privately appointed and paid
arbitrators? Although the arbitrators would be privately selected, all disputants
would presumably have at least a formal, equal, and fair say in selecting the
arbitrator.193 Clearly, if this process were purely private and confidential, it
would be problematic in terms of a public justice analysis, but what if the
hearings or results were public? Could these privately appointed arbitrators
provide substantive and procedural justice? Does this come down to an
empirical rather than a philosophical question? We can speculate that the
privately appointed arbitrators might favor more powerful or more
knowledgeable parties, thereby undercutting substantive and procedural justice,
but perhaps this favoritism would not occur.
The bottom line: Mandatory private arbitration as we know it today in the
United States is indeed unjust, both because it is imposed by a single private
193. Of course, the repeat player phenomenon, discussed supra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text, might still give certain disputants an edge in picking their
decisionmakers.
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party and because it is private. However, in rejecting mandatory private
arbitration we must not endorse our current mode of public litigation as the
only just form of dispute resolution. Rather, we must continue to search for an
array of dispute resolution processes that, together, will best help us achieve
justice.
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